The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Territorial Considerations by Anzivino, Ralph C.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 3 Spring 2013 Article 4
The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Territorial
Considerations
Ralph C. Anzivino
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Territorial Considerations, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 833 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss3/4
10 ANZIVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 2:20 PM 
 
THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT: 
TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
RALPH C. ANZIVINO* 
This Article primarily analyzes the impact of the territorial 
specifications of the Wisconsin Consumer Act on a consumer transaction.  
The Wisconsin Consumer Act specifies six territorial circumstances, and 
this Article analyzes each separately.  The six territorial circumstances are 
as follows: (1) Was the transaction “made in Wisconsin”?; (2) Is there 
collection activity in Wisconsin?; (3) Is there collection activity in a 
foreign jurisdiction?; (4) Did the transaction involve an open-end credit 
sale?; (5) Did the parties’ contract contain a Wisconsin or foreign choice-
of-law clause?; and (6) How do the WCA venue rules apply?  Depending 
on which of the territorial circumstances applies, all or some parts of the 
WCA will apply to the consumer transaction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is essential for any business or consumer lawyer to have a working 
understanding of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA).1  It has been 
over thirty years since there has been any serious analysis of the Act.  
Since that time, numerous amendments and hundreds of court decisions 
have changed and interpreted the statute.  The WCA is very intricate, 
and a failure to comply with its mandates has very serious consequences.  
As a result, debtors’ attorneys mine the statute for violations, and 
creditors’ attorneys seek to comply with the statute from the inception 
of the transaction. 
There are two primary inquiries that an attorney must make when 
defining the scope of the WCA.  First, the attorney must determine if 
the transaction is the type of consumer transaction that the Act intends 
to regulate.  If the consumer transaction is a consumer credit transaction 
or other specified transaction, the attorney answers the first inquiry in 
the affirmative.2  A prior article addressed the elements of a consumer 
credit transaction,3 and a subsequent article will address those additional 
transactions that are also subject to the Act.  Second, the attorney must 
recognize the territorial considerations mandated by the Act.  The 
territorial considerations relate to several variables: whether the 
consumer transaction was made in Wisconsin or out-of-state; whether 
collection activity is being conducted in Wisconsin or out-of-state; 
whether the parties’ contract contains a Wisconsin or foreign choice-of-
law provision, and whether the choice-of-law provision is legally 
effective in Wisconsin or out-of-state; and finally, whether proper venue 
exists for a consumer act claim.  This article will address all of the 
 
1. Wisconsin Statutes Chapters 421–27 collectively constitute the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act.  WIS. STAT. § 421.101 (2011–2012).  Chapter 421 is entitled “Consumer Transactions—
General Provisions and Definitions”; Chapter 422 is entitled “Consumer Credit 
Transactions”; Chapter 423 is entitled “Consumer Approval Transactions and Other 
Consumer Rights”; Chapter 424 is entitled “Consumer Transactions—Insurance”; Chapter 
425 is entitled “Consumer Transactions—Remedies and Penalties”; Chapter 426 is entitled 
“Consumer Transactions—Administration”; and Chapter 427 is entitled “Consumer 
Transactions—Debt Collection.”  Id. at chs. 421–27. 
2. See Dean Medical Ctr, S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, ¶ 6, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 
N.W.2d 194 (explaining that before the provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act can apply, 
“the obligation incurred must be the result of a consumer credit transaction”); see also WIS. 
STAT. § 421.301(10) (defining, for the purposes of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, what 
constitutes a “consumer credit transaction”). 
3. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: When Is a Transaction a Consumer 
Credit Transaction?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 205 (2012). 
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territorial issues that arise under the WCA. 
II. TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are six territorial considerations that arise under the WCA.  
The first territorial consideration is that all “consumer transactions 
made in [Wisconsin] and . . . modifications including refinancings, 
consolidations and deferrals, made in [Wisconsin], of consumer credit 
transactions wherever made[,]” are subject to the WCA.4  Thus, the 
critical determination for the attorney is whether the transaction was 
made in Wisconsin.  The second territorial consideration involves 
collection activity conducted in Wisconsin for a consumer transaction 
that was not made in Wisconsin.5  For WCA purposes, it is essential to 
determine whether the customer was a Wisconsin resident at the time of 
contracting.  The third territorial consideration deals with collection 
activity outside of Wisconsin.6  Notably, there are two circumstances 
where Wisconsin law will apply to the collection activity in another 
state.7  The fourth territorial consideration covers credit card sales to 
Wisconsin residents.8  The fifth territorial consideration entails 
consumer transactions that have a choice-of-law clause.9  A Wisconsin 
choice-of-law clause can have extra-territorial effect.10  And, perhaps 
more significantly, a foreign choice-of-law clause may have limited to no 
effect in Wisconsin depending on the facts in the case.11  Finally, the 
sixth territorial consideration encompasses issues determining proper 
venue under the WCA.12  Improper venue under the WCA has 
significantly different consequences than improper venue under a non-
 
4. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(1)–(2). 
5. Id. § 421.201(4)–(5). 
6. Id. § 421.201(5). 
7. See infra Part II.C. 
8. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(3). 
9. Id. § 421.201(9). 
10. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 454 F. Supp. 465, 472 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (“In 
determining whether a State may extend the effects of its laws beyond its borders, the 
Supreme Court has examined the degree of contacts which the State seeking to regulate has 
with the person and/or transaction sought to be regulated.”  (citing Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. 
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954))). 
11. See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing the three situations where a foreign choice-of-law 
clause will not apply despite the fact that the contract involves a resident of a state other than 
Wisconsin); see also infra Part II.E.3 (discussing the nullification of a foreign choice-of-law 
clause under section 421.201(10)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes). 
12. WIS. STAT. § 421.401. 
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WCA case.13  This Article analyzes each territorial consideration 
independently. 
A. Consumer Transactions Made in Wisconsin 
The WCA specifies three territorial circumstances, any one of which 
will cause a consumer transaction to be made in Wisconsin.  The first is 
when the merchant in Wisconsin receives an “offer of the customer.”14  
The second is when a “writing signed by the customer and evidencing 
the obligation . . . is received by the merchant in [Wisconsin].”15  And, 
the third is when “[t]he merchant induces the customer who is a resident 
of [Wisconsin] to enter into the transaction” through solicitation by 
face-to-face, mail, or telephone interaction “directed to the particular 
customer in [Wisconsin].”16  It is important to note that residency varies 
with the legislative enactment.17  The residence of a customer for WCA 
purposes is “the address given by the customer . . . in any writing signed 
by the customer in connection with a consumer transaction.”18  The 
customer’s given address remains as the correct address “until the 
merchant knows or has reason to know of a new or different address.”19  
One’s residence, however, may not be what he or she believes it is.  In 
Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.,20 Wehrenberg signed a 
consumer lease in California, and when litigation ensued, she claimed 
she was a Wisconsin resident.21  Wehrenberg argued that her lease was 
made in Wisconsin “because she considered Wisconsin to be her 
primary and permanent residence when she signed the lease.”22  The 
 
13. Compare id. § 801.50(1) (“A defect in venue shall not affect the validity of any order 
or judgment.”), with id. § 421.401(2)(a)–(b) (providing that improper venue, unless the 
defendant appears and waives it, requires the court to transfer or dismiss the action).  See also 
infra text accompanying notes 237–47 (explaining other significant differences between 
improper venue under the WCA and the general venue statutes). 
14. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(2)(a). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. § 421.201(2)(b). 
17. See, e.g., id. § 815.18(2)(r) (“‘Resident’ means an individual who intends to maintain 
his or her principal dwelling in this state.”). 
18. Id. § 421.201(8). 
19. Id. 
20. Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 2001AP0985, 2002 WL 24417 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002). 
21. Id. ¶ 4. 
22. Id. 
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court disagreed with her interpretation.23  Instead, the court reasoned 
that her “subjective belief that Wisconsin was her permanent residence 
[did] not transform a lease she signed in California, on which she listed a 
California address, into a lease [made] in . . . Wisconsin.”24 
Two of the three territorial circumstances that cause a consumer 
transaction to be made in Wisconsin require the merchant to have a 
place of business in Wisconsin.25  The third territorial circumstance, 
however, anticipates an out-of-state merchant contracting with a 
Wisconsin resident.26  Thus, the third territorial circumstance raises the 
issue of whether the WCA can constitutionally be applied to an 
interstate trader who has no place of business in Wisconsin.27  That issue 
has been resolved in favor of the State of Wisconsin.28 
In Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, Aldens was an Illinois corporation that 
sold its merchandise by mail order in all fifty states.29  Aldens’s only 
physical place of business was in Chicago.30  Aldens mailed catalogs and 
flyers to approximately 350,000 Wisconsin residents and had an active 
customer base of 65,000 Wisconsin residents.31  Aldens’s sales to 
Wisconsin residents averaged $4.6 million per year, and 73% of those 
sales were from credit sales, with the remaining 27% from cash sales.32  
On credit sales, Aldens retained purchase money security interests but 
never enforced them.33  Aldens sent all invoices and some product 
deliveries through the mail.34  Additionally, Aldens used the mail to 
attempt collection on delinquent accounts and also did so by telephone 
from Chicago.35  Aldens either wrote off seriously delinquent accounts 
 
23. See id. ¶ 5 (“We reject Wehrenberg’s argument.”). 
24. Id. 
25. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(2)(a) (2011–2012). 
26. Id. § 421.201(2)(b). 
27. See Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Aldens’s most 
vigorous constitutional attack questions the very existence of Wisconsin’s power to regulate a 
purely interstate trader.”). 
28. See id. at 753 (holding that “the application of the Wisconsin Consumer Act to 
Aldens,” an out of state corporation with no place of business in Wisconsin, “[was] 
constitutional”).  
29. Id. at 747. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 747–48. 
32. See id. at 748. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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or turned them over to “Illinois or Minnesota independent collection 
agencies . . . .”36  Concerning the WCA, Aldens brought a declaratory 
judgment action asserting that application of the WCA to its operations 
violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.37  In 
resolving the issue, the court balanced the interest of Wisconsin in 
protecting its citizens from unfair business practices against any 
interference with the natural functioning of interstate markets.38  The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that the WCA was not an undue burden on 
interstate commerce when applied to an interstate merchant who was 
contracting with Wisconsin residents in Wisconsin.39 
Finally, it is important to note that an in rem proceeding to repossess 
collateral pursuant to the WCA can be brought in Wisconsin even 
though the collateral is not in Wisconsin, provided the transaction was 
made in Wisconsin.40  In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Schalow, a 
consumer leased an automobile from GMAC in Wisconsin.41  
Subsequently, the consumer defaulted on his lease payments, and 
GMAC brought a replevin action.42  GMAC was unable to personally 
serve the consumer and completed service by publication.43  Thereafter, 
GMAC repossessed the vehicle.44  The consumer argued that since 
replevin is an in rem proceeding, the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction without proof that the vehicle was in Wisconsin when the 
action was commenced.45  The court disagreed.46  Instead, the court 
noted that the WCA does not require that the collateral be located in 
Wisconsin as a prerequisite to commencing a remedial action.47  The 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 746–47. 
38. See id. at 749–50. 
39. See id. at 753.  It should be noted that the court indicated that if the Wisconsin 
residents had summer homes in another state, the WCA could not regulate Aldens’s credit 
terms for those transactions made in another state.  See id. at 750–51 & n.10.   
40. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Schalow, No. 1987AP2127, 1988 WL 136048, at *2 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1988). 
41. Id. at *1. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (“There are several reasons why Schalow fails to succeed in his argument that 
unless the property is in the state at the commencement of the action the court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction.”). 
47. Id. at *2. 
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only prerequisites to a remedial action under the WCA are that the 
action stems from a consumer credit transaction48 and that the 
transaction was made in Wisconsin.49  The court indicated that the 
purpose of the remedial action is to determine the “right of 
possession . . . not possession itself.”50  Therefore, only once the parties 
resolve the right to possession does “the situs of the [collateral] become 
important.”51 
B. Collection Activity in Wisconsin 
If a consumer transaction is not made in Wisconsin, as explained in 
the preceding section, certain provisions of the WCA may still apply to 
the transaction when collection activity is conducted in Wisconsin.  First, 
certain defined provisions of the WCA will universally apply to any 
collection activity conducted in Wisconsin under any type of consumer 
transaction.52  Second, in addition to the universal provisions of the 
WCA, certain other provisions of the WCA will also apply to collection 
activity conducted in Wisconsin if the out-of-state transaction involved a 
Wisconsin resident.53  Finally, even if the out-of-state consumer 
transaction did not involve a Wisconsin resident and the parties agreed 
on a foreign choice-of-law clause, if the foreign state’s laws conflict with 
certain provisions of the WCA, those foreign laws will not be effective 
when collection activity is conducted in Wisconsin.54  This section 
analyzes each type of transaction. 
1. Universal Application 
There are two parts of the WCA that will always apply when 
collection activity is conducted in Wisconsin.  First, Chapter 427 (Debt 
Collection) “applies to any debt collection activity in [Wisconsin], 
 
48. Id. at *2; see also Parent v. CitiBank (S.D.) N.A., No. 09-C-951, slip op. at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. June 11, 2010) (noting that the WCA will not apply to a transaction unless it constitutes 
a consumer transaction, rather than a business transaction). 
49. Schalow, 1988 WL 136048, at *2. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(4) (2011–2012) (“Chapter 427 applies to any debt collection 
activity in this state, including debt collection by means of mail or telephone communications 
directed to customers in this state.”); see infra text accompanying notes 58–79 (discussing 
section 421.201(5) of the Wisconsin Statutes).   
53. See WIS. STAT. § 421.201(6); see also infra Part II.B.2. 
54. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421.201(7)–(9)(a); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
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including . . . by means of mail or telephone” against customers in 
Wisconsin.55  It is important to note that in order for Chapter 427 to 
apply to creditor collection activity, the debtor need only be a customer 
in Wisconsin and not a resident of Wisconsin.56  A customer is simply 
one “who seeks or acquires real or personal property, services, money 
or credit for personal, family or household purposes.”57 
Second, Subchapter I (Creditor’s Remedies) and Subchapter II 
(Enforcement of Security Interests in Collateral) of Chapter 425 apply 
to any proceeding “brought in [Wisconsin] to enforce rights arising from 
[a] consumer transaction[],” including repossession, and only require 
either that the customer be in Wisconsin or that the transaction involve 
an extortionate extension of credit.58  Again, it is important to note that 
in order for Subchapters I and II of Chapter 425 to apply to creditor 
collection activity in Wisconsin, the debtor need only be a customer in 
Wisconsin and not a resident of Wisconsin.59  For example, in Walser 
Leasing, Inc. v. Simonson,60 Wisconsin residents61 entered into a lease 
agreement with a Minnesota lessor that contained a Minnesota choice-
of-law clause.62  The Wisconsin residents subsequently defaulted under 
the lease agreement, and the Minnesota lessor repossessed the vehicles 
in Wisconsin in violation of the WCA.63  The Minnesota lessor claimed 
that the lease agreement’s Minnesota choice-of-law provision precluded 
the application of the WCA to the repossession.64  The court, however, 
rejected the lessor’s argument.65  The court reasoned that when the 
Minnesota merchant sent its agents into Wisconsin, the creditor became 
 
55. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(4). 
56. See id. (“Chapter 427 applies to any debt collection activity in this state . . . directed 
to customers in this state.”).  
57. Id. § 421.301(17). 
58. Id. §§ 421.201(5), 421.301(10); see id. § 425.108 (covering extortionate extensions of 
credit).  
59. See id. § 421.201(5). 
60. Walser Leasing, Inc. v. Simonson, 120 Wis. 2d 458, 355 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1984). 
61. The Walsers’ residency was not relevant to their case because the prohibition against 
self-help repossession is contained in section 425.206 of the Wisconsin Statutes and is 
triggered by section 421.201(5).  WIS. STAT. §§ 421.201(5), 425.206.  Section 421.201(5) 
requires either that the customer be in Wisconsin or that the transaction involve an 
extortionate extension of credit.  See id. § 421.201(5). 
62. See Walser, 120 Wis. 2d at 460, 355 N.W.2d at 546.  
63. Id. 
64. See id. at 459, 355 N.W.2d at 545. 
65. Id. at 460–61, 355 N.W.2d at 546. 
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subject to the WCA “just as they were subject to Wisconsin’s traffic 
laws” once in Wisconsin.66  
Subchapter I and Subchapter II of Chapter 425 applies to in-state 
collection activity notwithstanding that the parties’ contract contains a 
foreign choice-of-law clause.67  In Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Kong,68 the 
debtors purchased a vehicle from a dealer in Minnesota with a down 
payment and financed the balance of the purchase price.69  The contract 
had a choice-of-law provision specifying that Minnesota law would 
apply to the contract.70  Upon default by the debtors, Credit Acceptance 
Corporation (CAC) repossessed the vehicle in Wisconsin through self-
help.71  Thereafter, CAC sought a deficiency judgment, and the debtors 
counterclaimed for WCA violations.72  The central issue before the court 
was whether the WCA applied to the transaction.73  The court noted that 
the transaction was not made in Wisconsin but that “certain portions of 
the WCA apply to actions or other proceedings ‘brought in this state to 
enforce rights arising from consumer transactions . . . wherever made.’”74  
CAC argued, however, that the parties’ choice-of-law provision applying 
Minnesota law should preclude application of the WCA.75  Specifically, 
CAC argued that the WCA provides that a choice-of-law provision is 
only invalid when all the provisions of the WCA are in application,76 and 
in this case, since only Subchapters I and II of Chapter 425 applied, the 
parties’ choice-of-law provision should control.77  The court, however, 
 
66. Id. at 461, 355 N.W.2d at 546. 
67. See WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(a) (2011–2012) (stating that terms of a writing 
purporting to apply the law of another state are invalid).   
68. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Kong, 2012 WI App 98, 344 Wis. 2d 259, 822 N.W.2d 
506.  
69. Id. ¶ 2. 
70. Id. ¶ 3. 
71. See id. ¶¶ 5–6; see also 2 JAY E. GRENIG & NATHAN A. FISHBACH, WISCONSIN 
PRACTICE SERIES: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 71.11 (5th ed.) (explaining that some states 
permit “self-help” repossession).  Self-help repossession “allow[s] creditors to repossess 
collateral without legal process upon a default by the borrower/consumer and without entry 
of judgment by a court.”  Id.  
72. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2012 WI App 98, ¶ 5, 344 Wis. 2d 259, 822 N.W.2d 506. 
73. Id. ¶ 9. 
74. Id. ¶¶ 10–11 (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5) (2009–2010)). 
75. Id. ¶ 15. 
76. See id. (providing that a foreign choice-of-law clause is “invalid ‘with respect to 
consumer transactions . . . to which [WIS. STAT.] chs. 421 to 427 apply’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(a))).  
77. See id. ¶ 15. 
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disagreed and held that “[a]s long as some portion of the WCA is 
applicable, no choice-of-law provisions are effective.”78  This Article 
questions the validity of the Credit Acceptance Corp. decision and 
proposes a different approach to invalidating choice-of-law provisions.79 
2. Out-of-State Consumer Transactions with a Wisconsin Resident 
In addition to the parts of the WCA that universally apply,80 other 
provisions of the WCA provide additional protections to out-of-state 
consumer transactions and modifications made “with a customer who is 
a resident of [Wisconsin] when the transaction or modification is 
made.”81  The prerequisite to applying the WCA to an out-of-state 
transaction is that the consumer is a Wisconsin resident at the time of 
contracting.82  Residency is determined in different ways depending on 
the statute under consideration,83 but under the WCA, the address given 
on the contract determines residency.84  For instance, where a consumer 
signed a lease in California and listed her address as one in California, 
her subjective belief that she was a Wisconsin resident at the time of 
contracting did not persuade the court that she was a Wisconsin resident 
for WCA purposes.85 
Once Wisconsin residency is determined, there are three additional 
areas of WCA protection.  First, only those charges permitted by 
Chapter 422 are recoverable by the creditor or assignee.86  Second, the 
“merchant may not enforce rights against the customer to the extent” 
prohibited by Subchapter IV (Limitations on Agreements and 
Practices) of Chapter 422.87  Third, the “merchant may not enforce rights 
 
78. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(a)). 
79. See infra Part II.E.3. 
80. See supra Part II.B.1.  
81. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(6) (2011–2012). 
82. Id. 
83. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 815.18(2)(r) (“‘Resident’ means an individual who intends to 
maintain his or her principal dwelling in this state.”). 
84. For WCA purposes, any customer is a Wisconsin resident if “the address given by 
the customer as his or her residence in any writing signed by the customer in connection with 
the consumer transaction” is a Wisconsin address.  WIS. STAT. § 421.201(8).  The customer’s 
given address remains as the correct address “until the merchant knows or has reason to 
know of a new or different address.”  Id. 
85. Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 2001AP0985, 2002 WL 24417, ¶ 4  
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002). 
86. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(6)(a). 
87. Id. § 421.201(6)(b). 
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against the customer to the extent” prohibited by Chapter 423 
(Consumer Approval Transactions and Other Consumer Rights).88 
3. Out-of-State Consumer Transactions with Non-Residents 
As a general rule, “a consumer transaction or modification . . . made 
in another state with a customer who [is] not a [Wisconsin] 
resident . . . when the consumer transaction or modification [is] made, is 
valid and enforceable in [Wisconsin] according to its terms to the 
extent” those terms are valid in the other state.89  However, debt 
collection activity and any other proceeding brought in Wisconsin to 
enforce rights arising from such a consumer transaction, including 
repossession, must comply with certain parts of the WCA even though 
the transaction may not have been made in Wisconsin, or involve a 
Wisconsin resident, because those provisions apply universally in 
Wisconsin.90  Thus, any conflict between the universally applicable 
provisions of the WCA and the parties’ contract terms (e.g., a clause 
authorizing self-help repossession) will be resolved in favor of the 
WCA. 
C. Collection Activity Outside of Wisconsin 
Generally, the WCA will not apply to an action or proceeding to 
recover “collateral or goods subject to a motor vehicle consumer lease” 
where the collateral or goods are located in another state.91  Rather, the 
law of the state where the collateral is located will control.92  There are, 
however, a couple of exceptions to this general rule. 
First, albeit the collateral may be in another state, the WCA will 
apply where “the collateral or goods subject to a motor vehicle 
consumer lease are owned by a Wisconsin resident,93 who has removed 
the collateral . . . from [Wisconsin]” to attend his employment, to use in 
his employment, or “for temporary periods which do not exceed 15 
days.”94  This exception is the employment/temporary removal 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. § 421.201(7). 
90. See supra Part II.B.1. 
91. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5). 
92. Id. 
93. Residency under the WCA is determined by the customer’s address given on the 
contract, not the customer’s intent at the time of contracting.  See supra notes 18–19 and 
accompanying text. 
94. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5). 
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exception. 
Though there is sparse legislative history on the 
employment/temporary removal exception, a Wisconsin court has 
addressed the exception.95  In Patrin v. Chrysler Credit Corp., Wisconsin 
residents purchased a motor vehicle from a Minnesota car dealer on 
credit.96  Subsequently, the debtors defaulted, and the vehicle was 
repossessed in Minnesota while the Wisconsin resident was at work in 
Minnesota.97  The complaint did not indicate where the consumer credit 
transaction took place.98  The court stated the issue to be “whether the 
limited extraterritorial extension contained in § 421.201(5) of the 
[WCA] [could] be applied to prohibit [self-help] repossession by out-of-
state creditors of collateral owned by Wisconsin residents [in another 
state].”99  Importantly, the court noted that if the WCA is “read without 
any restrictions, to apply extraterritorially to out-of-state 
merchants . . . serious due process [issues] could arise . . . .”100  The court 
stated that it is clear that  
Wisconsin has no constitutional authority to apply [the WCA] to 
a non-resident merchant or creditor having no contact with 
[Wisconsin] other than the fact that it consummated a 
transaction with a Wisconsin resident outside the state of 
Wisconsin and later repossessed the resident’s collateral while it 
was outside the state for use in the resident’s employment.101 
Notably, the court left open whether Wisconsin can apply the WCA to 
“out-of-state merchants and creditors who enter into commercial 
transactions with Wisconsin residents outside of [Wisconsin], but who 
are registered to do business in Wisconsin . . . and who do undertake 
substantial business activity in Wisconsin.”102  The court also did not 
answer the level of activity required to subject a merchant to the WCA’s 
extraterritorial extension under section 421.201(5).103  However, the 
court indicated that the necessary showing required a more substantial 
 
95. Patrin v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 530 F. Supp. 736, 738 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
96. Id. at 737. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 739. 
100. Id. at 739–40. 
101. Id. at 740. 
102. Id. 
103. Id.  
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connection than that required to establish minimum contacts for 
personal service.104  In this case, the court concluded that the Wisconsin 
residents failed to plead enough facts to show a sufficient nexus between 
the Minnesota merchant and Wisconsin to warrant the application of 
Wisconsin’s police power.105 
Though the Patrin court did not address the level of activity required 
for Wisconsin’s extraterritorial reach, the type of activity required to 
subject an interstate merchant, not registered to do business in a state, 
to the extraterritorial reach of a state’s police power has been 
determined.106  In Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, Aldens challenged the 
constitutionality of Oklahoma’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code.107  The 
court noted that when determining the extraterritorial scope of state 
legislation a court must consider the “degree of contacts” between the 
state and the transaction to be regulated.108  The contacts in Ryan 
included solicitations by Aldens in Oklahoma, goods shipped from 
Illinois to Oklahoma, and payments sent by Oklahoma residents to 
Illinois.109  As a result, the court found “direct and continuing contacts” 
between Oklahoma and Aldens sufficient to justify Oklahoma’s 
regulation of the contracts between Aldens and the Oklahoma residents 
it was doing business with.110 
Second, if the parties’ original agreement contained a choice-of-law 
provision indicating that Wisconsin law will control any dispute between 
the parties, Wisconsin law may apply to legal action in the other state.  
In First Wisconsin National Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou,111 Wisconsin 
customers financed the purchase of an automobile from a Wisconsin 
merchant.112  The contract between the parties provided that their 
 
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
106. See Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 454 F. Supp. 465, 472 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (“Where a 
contract affects the people of several States, each may have an interest which leaves it free to 
enforce its own contract policies.”  (citing Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 
66, 73 (1954))); see also id. (citing Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 180, 183 (1964) 
(holding that Florida had sufficient contacts with the transaction and the parties to apply its 
laws in accordance with constitutional requirements)). 
107. Aldens, Inc., v. Ryan, 454 F. Supp. at 468–69. 
108. Id. at 472. 
109. Id. at 473. 
110. Id. 
111. First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d 393, 270 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. 
App. 1978). 
112. Id. at 395, 270 N.W.2d at 583. 
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agreement was “to be ‘governed by the internal laws of Wisconsin.’”113  
Thereafter, the customer moved to California without the merchant’s 
knowledge.114  Upon default by the customer, the merchant repossessed 
and sold the vehicle in California for less than the amount of the 
outstanding debt.115  The merchant accomplished the repossession 
through self-help, which was allowed under California law but not under 
the WCA.116  When the merchant sought to recover the deficiency in 
Wisconsin,117 the customer counterclaimed that the repossession violated 
the WCA.118  The court had to decide whether Wisconsin or California 
law controlled the repossession that took place in California.119  
Generally, the WCA provides that the law of the state where the 
collateral is located governs out-of-state repossessions.120  In this case, 
that would be California law.  However, the court held that the extra-
territorial language of section 421.201(5) of the WCA did not qualify as 
“internal law” of Wisconsin since it only operated outside of 
Wisconsin.121  As a result, the court held that all the remaining provisions 
of the WCA were the “internal law” of Wisconsin and thereby governed 
the repossession in California.122  Subsequently, one federal court in 
Wisconsin confirmed that if the parties’ contract in Nicolaou had not 
contained the Wisconsin choice-of-law clause, California law would 
have controlled the repossession.123  Nevertheless, Nicolaou indicates 
that a consumer transaction between a Wisconsin resident and a 
Wisconsin merchant that contains a Wisconsin choice-of-law clause will 
 
113. Id. at 397, 270 N.W.2d at 584.  “Internal laws” mean “the law [that] would govern 
[a] purely domestic Wisconsin [dispute].”  Id. at 399, 270 N.W.2d at 585. 
114. Id. at 395, 270 N.W.2d at 583. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. at 396, 270 N.W.2d at 584 (citing Adams v. S. Cal. First Nat’l Bank, 492 F.2d 
324, 332 (9th Cir. 1973)) (explaining that self-help repossession is permissible under 
California law); id. at 397, 270 N.W.2d at 584 (citing and using the 1975–1976 version of 
section 425.206(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes, a previous version of the Wisconsin rule 
prohibiting self-help); see also WIS. STAT. § 425.206(1) (2011–2012). 
117. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 395, 270 N.W.2d at 583. 
118. Id. at 394, 270 N.W.2d at 583. 
119. Id. at 396, 270 N.W.2d at 584. 
120. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5). 
121. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 398, 270 N.W.2d at 585; see also WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5) 
(“[C]onduct, action or proceedings to recover collateral or goods subject to a motor vehicle 
consumer lease shall be governed by the law of the state where the collateral or goods subject to 
a motor vehicle consumer lease are located at the time of recovery . . . .”  (emphasis added)). 
122. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 399–400, 270 N.W.2d at 585–86. 
123. Patrin v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 530 F. Supp. 736, 739 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
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apply the WCA to any legal action in a foreign jurisdiction.124   
D. Open-End Credit Plans 
Regarding open-end credit plans,125 the WCA applies if the customer 
is a Wisconsin resident and one of the following occurs: (1) if “the open-
end creditor or a merchant honoring a credit card issued by the open-
end creditor, is a [Wisconsin] resident”; (2) if the merchant is not a 
Wisconsin resident, the merchant must have “furnishe[d], mail[ed] or 
deliver[ed] the goods, services or credit to a [Wisconsin] resident 
. . . while the customer [was] [in Wisconsin]”; or (3) if the merchant is 
not a Wisconsin resident, the merchant receives a writing proving the 
transaction that is signed by the Wisconsin resident in Wisconsin.126  
Ultimately, Wisconsin residency is the sine qua non127 when applying the 
WCA to credit card sales to Wisconsin residents.128  The WCA will also 
apply to any transaction if the customer is a Wisconsin resident and the 
parties agree that Wisconsin law applies to their transaction.129 
Many credit card sales in Wisconsin involve an out-of-state merchant 
selling to a Wisconsin customer.130  Unquestionably, compliance with the 
numerous requirements of the WCA is a burden on an interstate 
merchant.  Is the burden, however, so heavy as to cause an 
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce?  Aldens, Inc. v. 
 
124. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 399–400, 270 N.W.2d at 585–86.  It should be noted that it is 
not best practice to use the term “internal law” when drafting a choice-of-law clause.  See 
supra Part II.E.  
125. An open-end credit plan as defined under Wisconsin law is the extension of credit 
to a consumer pursuant to a plan where: the creditor allows a customer “to make 
purchases . . . from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit 
card”; the customer can pay the balance “in full or in installments”; the creditor can impose a 
finance charge on an outstanding balance; and “[t]he creditor has treated the transaction as 
open-end consumer credit for purposes of any disclosures required under the federal 
consumer credit protection act.”  WIS. STAT. § 421.301(27). 
126. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(3). 
127. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1511 (9th ed. 2009) (“An indispensable condition or 
thing; something on which something else necessarily depends.”). 
128. See Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 2001AP0985, 2002 WL 24417 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002) (explaining that residency under the WCA is determined by the 
address the customer put on the contract regardless of the customer’s subjective belief); supra 
notes 16–39 and accompanying text. 
129. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(9)(b).  For a discussion of Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d 393, 270 
N.W.2d 582, where the parties’ contract had a Wisconsin choice-of-law clause, see Part II.C.  
130. See, e.g., Part II.A. (discussing Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 
1977)). 
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LaFollette raised that issue.131  Aldens sold goods on credit to Wisconsin 
residents.132  The company had its only physical place of business in 
Illinois.133  Aldens brought a declaratory judgment action against the 
State of Wisconsin seeking a determination that the WCA was an undue 
burden on interstate commerce.134  The court balanced the interests of 
Wisconsin in protecting its residents against the burden on interstate 
merchants of complying with the WCA135 and concluded that the burden 
on interstate commerce was a tolerable one.136 
E. Choice-of-Law 
1. Wisconsin Choice-of-Law Clauses 
The WCA will apply to a consumer transaction if the customer is a 
Wisconsin resident at the time of the transaction and the parties’ choice-
of-law provision provides Wisconsin law controls, no matter where the 
contract was made.137  The WCA provides a very concrete definition for 
determining residency.138  A party’s subjective intent is often used as the 
standard for determining  residency,139 but was expressly rejected under 
the WCA.140  Additionally, a Wisconsin choice-of-law provision is valid 
notwithstanding that it may also provide that the Federal Arbitration 
Act shall govern any arbitration between the parties.141 
A Wisconsin choice-of-law provision will not only apply to litigation 
in Wisconsin but also to litigation in another state.  In First Wisconsin 
 
131. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745. 
132. Id. at 748. 
133. Id. at 747. 
134. Id. at 746–47. 
135. Id. at 752. 
136. Id. at 753. 
137. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(9)(b) (2011–2012). 
138. Id. § 421.201(8) (“[T]he residence of a customer is the address given by the 
customer as his or her residence in any writing signed by the customer in connection with a 
consumer transaction.”); see supra  notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
139. See WIS. STAT. § 815.18(2)(r) (“‘Resident’ means an individual who intends to 
maintain his or her principal dwelling in this state.”). 
140. See supra Part II.A (discussing Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 
2001AP0985, 2002 WL 24417 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002)). 
141. Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes, 2012 WI App 12, ¶ 15, 339 Wis. 2d 472, 810 N.W.2d 
852 (enforcing loan agreement with a choice-of-law clause).  The loan agreement provided, 
“This Loan Agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of Wisconsin, except that the 
arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’).”  Id. 
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National Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou,142 a Wisconsin consumer 
purchased an automobile on credit from a Wisconsin dealer.143  
Subsequently, the consumer moved the automobile to California 
without the creditor’s consent.144  Thereafter, the consumer defaulted on 
the required payments, and the creditor repossessed the vehicle in 
California without judicial process.145  The repossession conformed to 
California law but violated the WCA.146  After selling the vehicle, the 
creditor brought an action in Wisconsin to recover the deficiency.147  The 
sole issue before the court was whether California or Wisconsin law 
governed the repossession of the vehicle in California.148  The contract 
between the parties provided that “the agreement was to be ‘governed 
by the internal laws of Wisconsin.’”149  The court reasoned that the part 
of section 421.201(5) of the WCA that provides that “‘proceedings to 
recover collateral shall be governed by the law of the state where the 
collateral is located at the time of its recovery,’” operates outside of 
Wisconsin, and as such, it “does not qualify as [Wisconsin] ‘internal 
law.’”150  Consequently, the court held that section 421.201(5) was not 
applicable.151  As a result, the court reasoned that the remaining 
provisions of the WCA (absent section 421.201(5)) were the internal law 
of Wisconsin and therefore applicable to the repossession in 
California.152  Thus, the court held that a choice-of-law provision, which 
provided that Wisconsin law shall control, made Wisconsin internal law 
(“the law [that] would govern [a] purely domestic Wisconsin 
[dispute]”)153 applicable to any contract enforcement act wherever it 
 
142. First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d 393, 270 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. 
App. 1978). 
143. See id. at 395–96, 270 N.W.2d at 583–84 (deeming that the issue the court must 
resolve involved “repossession of [a] van which constituted the collateral under the consumer 
installment sale and security agreement”). 
144. Id. at 395, 270 N.W.2d at 583.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. at 396–97, 270 N.W.2d at 584. 
147. Id. at 395, 270 N.W.2d at 583. 
148. Id. at 396, 270 N.W.2d at 584. 
149. Id. at 397, 270 N.W.2d at 584. 
150. Id. at 398, 270 N.W.2d at 585 (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5) (1975–1976)). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 399–400, 270 N.W.2d at 585–86. 
153. See id. at 399, 270 N.W.2d at 585; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (9th ed. 
2009).  Local law is defined as analogous to internal law: “The law of a particular jurisdiction, 
as opposed to the law of a foreign state. — Also termed internal law.”  Id. 
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might occur.154  Absent the choice-of-law provision specifying Wisconsin 
law, California law would have controlled the repossession.155 
Significantly, the court in Nicolaou stated that even if the contract 
would have provided that the “agreement [was] governed by the law of 
Wisconsin” and deleted the word “internal,” the court’s reasoning 
would have been the same.156  However, that result may not necessarily 
follow.  The concept of what constitutes the “internal law” of a state as 
discussed in Nicolaou is not a defined term.  Yet, the term “local law” is 
a generally defined term, which is “the body of standards, principles and 
rules [of a state], exclusive of its [choice-of-law rules] . . . .”157  By 
comparison, the term “law” is the state’s “local law” plus its choice-of-
law rules.158  Thus, best practice suggests that to avoid a future choice-of-
law problem under the WCA, the choice-of-law clause should provide 
that  “Wisconsin local law” will control, not “Wisconsin law.” 
2. Foreign Choice-of-Law Clauses 
If the customer is a resident of Wisconsin and the WCA applies to 
the consumer transaction, any foreign choice-of-law clause is invalid.159  
However, if a “customer is not a [Wisconsin] resident . . . at the time of a 
consumer transaction and the parties then agree that the law of his or 
her residence applies” to the transaction (choice-of-law), then the WCA 
does not apply.160  Similarly,  
a consumer transaction or modification . . . made in another state 
 
154. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 399, 270 N.W.2d at 585.  
155. Patrin v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 530 F. Supp. 736, 739 (W.D. Wis. 1982) 
(“[Nicolaou] is very narrow and depends exclusively on the contractual choice-of-law 
provision.  Absent that provision, [i.e., absent the agreement that Wisconsin “internal law” 
applies,] the plaintiff’s act of repossession would have been governed by the law of 
California.”). 
156. See Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d at 398 & n.2, 270 N.W.2d at 585 & n.2. 
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1971) (“As used in the 
Restatement of this Subject, the ‘local law’ of a state is the body of standards, principles and 
rules, exclusive of its rules of Conflict of Laws, which the courts of that state apply in the 
decision of controversies brought before them.”); see State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Pyare Square 
Corp., 112 Wis. 2d 65, 69 n.2, 331 N.W.2d 656, 658 n.2 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Restatement § 4 
with approval). 
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1971) (“As used in the 
Restatement of this Subject, the ‘law’ of a state is that state’s local law, together with its rules 
of Conflict of Laws.”). 
159. WIS. STAT § 421.201(10) (2011–2012); see infra Part II.E.3. 
160. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(9)(a). 
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with a customer who [is] not a [Wisconsin] resident . . . when 
the . . . transaction or modification [is] made, is valid and 
enforceable in [Wisconsin] according to its terms to the extent 
that it is valid and enforceable [in the other state].161   
There are, however, three exceptions where the foreign law will not be 
applicable.162  First, Chapter 427 (Debt Collection) of the WCA will 
apply to any collection activity in Wisconsin.163 
Second, Subchapter I (Creditor’s Remedies) and Subchapter II 
(Enforcement of Security Interests in Collateral) of Chapter 425 
(Remedies & Penalties) apply to any proceeding brought in Wisconsin 
to enforce rights arising from a consumer transaction, including 
repossession.164  In Walser Leasing, Inc. v. Simonson,165 Wisconsin 
residents166 leased two cars from a Minnesota lessor.167  Subsequently, the 
Wisconsin residents defaulted on their lease payments, and the 
Minnesota lessor repossessed the vehicles in Wisconsin without a court 
order or the debtor’s consent, in violation of the WCA.168  The 
Minnesota lessor claimed that the lease agreement’s choice-of-law 
provision (applying Minnesota law) and the due process clause 
precluded the application of the WCA to the repossession.169  The court 
rejected both of the lessor’s arguments.170  Instead, the court reasoned 
that when the creditor sent its agents into Wisconsin to repossess the 
vehicle, the creditor became subject to the WCA just as it became 
subject to Wisconsin’s traffic laws.171  Thus, the choice-of-law clause 
applying Minnesota law was of no effect. 
Third, notwithstanding a foreign choice-of-law provision, the WCA 
 
161. Id. § 421.201(7). 
162. See id. § 421.201(7), (9)(a). 
163. Id. § 421.201(4) (“Chapter 427 applies to any debt collection activity in this state, 
including debt collection by means of mail or telephone communications directed to 
customers in this state.”). 
164. Id. § 421.201(5). 
165. Walser Leasing, Inc. v. Simonson, 120 Wis. 2d 458, 355 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1984). 
166. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 421.201(5), .206 and 
explaining that the Walsers’ residency was actually irrelevant in this particular case). 
167. Walser, 120 Wis. 2d at 460, 355 N.W.2d at 546. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 459, 355 N.W.2d at 545. 
170. See id. at 459–60, 355 N.W.2d at 545–46 (affirming the lower courts judgment and 
thus rejecting both of Walser’s contentions). 
171. See id. at 460–61, 355 N.W.2d at 546.   
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will apply where “the collateral or goods subject to a motor vehicle 
consumer lease are owned by a Wisconsin resident, who has removed 
the collateral . . . from [Wisconsin]” to attend his employment, to use in 
his employment, or “for temporary periods [that] do not exceed 15 
days.”172 
This is the employment/temporary removal exception.173  The courts 
have provided limited guidance on its use.  In Patrin v. Chrysler Credit 
Corp., Wisconsin residents purchased a motor vehicle on credit from a 
Minnesota car dealer.174  Following the customer’s default, the merchant 
repossessed the vehicle in Minnesota while the Wisconsin resident was 
at work.175  In subsequent litigation between the parties, the customer 
claimed the Minnesota self-help repossession violated the temporary 
removal exception of the WCA.176  The primary issue before the court 
was whether the extra-territorial extension of section 421.201(5) of the 
WCA applies to an out-of-state repossession of collateral owned by a 
Wisconsin resident.177  The court noted that “serious due process [issues] 
could arise” if section 421.201(5) applied to out-of-state merchants 
without any limitations.178  As an initial matter, the court indicated that 
section 421.201(5) could not apply to an out-of-state merchant whose 
only contact with Wisconsin was the fact that the merchant entered into 
a contract outside of Wisconsin with a Wisconsin resident.179  The court 
opined that for the employment/temporary removal exception to apply 
to a transaction, the customer must prove a more substantial connection 
between the merchant and Wisconsin than that required to establish 
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.180  In the court’s opinion, the 
debtor’s evidence did not establish sufficient contacts to warrant 
application of the employment/temporary removal exception to the 
repossession.181 
 
172. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5) (2011–2012). 
173. Patrin v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 530 F. Supp. 736, 739 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
174. Id. at 737. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 739–40. 
178. Id. at 740. 
179. Id.  
180. Id. 
181. Id.; see supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text (discussing contacts sufficient to 
extend the employment/temporary removal exception to an out-of-state merchant). 
10 ANZIVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2013  5:12 PM 
2013] THE WCA: TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS 853 
3. Nullification of Foreign Choice-of-Law Clauses 
The WCA also provides that if Chapters 421 to 427 apply to a 
transaction, any choice-of-law provision that provides that the law of 
another state shall apply is invalid.182  Per Mar Security & Research Corp. 
v. Livesey illustrates the choice-of-law nullification.183  In Per Mar, a 
Wisconsin resident signed a contract for the installation of a home 
security system that included an annual fee for monitoring services.184  
The contract contained an Iowa choice-of-law clause.185  When litigation 
ensued between the parties, the parties addressed the validity of the 
foreign choice-of-law clause.186  It was clear that Chapters 421 to 427 
applied to the transaction.187  As a result, the court concluded that the 
foreign choice-of-law clause was not valid.188 
The statutory condition precedent that nullifies a choice-of-law 
clause is that the transaction at issue is one “to which [Chapters] 421 to 
427 apply.”189  However, is the statutory condition precedent satisfied if 
only part of the WCA applies to the consumer transaction, or does it 
require that all of the Chapters of the WCA apply?  Obviously, that 
determination will impact the scope of the nullification of a foreign 
choice-of-law provision.  This issue was addressed in Credit Acceptance 
Corp. v. Kong.190  In Credit Acceptance Corp., the customer financed the 
purchase of a vehicle from a dealer in Minnesota.191  The contract had a 
choice-of-law provision specifying that Minnesota law governed the 
 
182. See WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(a) (2011–2012) (stating that terms of a contract 
purporting to apply the law of another state are invalid); see also Coady v. Cross Country 
Bank, Inc., 2007 WI App 26, ¶ 12, 299 Wis. 2d 420, 729 N.W.2d 732 (citing WIS. STAT. 
§ 135.025(3) (2003–2004)) (comparing section 421.201(10)(a) to the provision of the 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law that expressly states that it cannot be circumvented by 
contract because both laws are meant to protect against unfair business practices by parties 
with superior bargaining power). 
183. Per Mar Sec. & Research Corp. v. Livesey, No. 2006AP1351, 2007 WL 1041265 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007).  It should be noted, however, that choice-of-law was not an issue 
raised on appeal in this case.  Id.  
184. Id. ¶ 3. 
185. Id. ¶ 9. 
186. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
187. Id. ¶ 8. 
188. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
189. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10) (2011–2012). 
190. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Kong, 2012 WI App 98, 344 Wis. 2d 259, 822 N.W.2d 
506. 
191. Id. ¶ 2. 
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parties’ rights.192  When the customer defaulted, Credit Acceptance 
Corporation (CAC) used self-help to repossess the vehicle in 
Wisconsin.193  After the repossession of the vehicle, CAC sought a 
judgment for the deficiency, and the debtors counterclaimed for 
damages due to WCA violations.194  The primary issue in the case was 
whether the WCA applied to the transaction.195  The court noted that 
even though the transaction was not made in Wisconsin, section 
421.201(5) provides that “certain portions of the WCA apply to actions 
or other proceedings ‘brought in [Wisconsin] to enforce rights arising 
from consumer transactions . . . wherever made.’”196 
CAC asserted, however, that the contract’s Minnesota choice-of-law 
provision precluded application of the WCA.197  Specifically, CAC 
posited that a choice-of-law provision is only invalid under the WCA 
when all the provisions of the WCA are in application, and since only 
Subchapters I and II of Chapter 425 were in application in this case, the 
parties’ choice-of-law provision should control.198  The court, however, 
rejected CAC’s arguments and held that “[a]s long as some portion of 
the WCA is applicable, no choice-of-law provisions are effective.”199  
Thus, section 421.201(10) was applied to nullify the Minnesota choice-
of-law clause in the parties’ contract. 
Upon review, it is apparent that the Credit Acceptance Corp. court 
reached the correct result with a questionable analysis.  The opinion 
does not state whether the debtors were Wisconsin residents or not,200 
but that is not determinative of the outcome.  It is clear, however, that 
the self–help repossession occurred in Wisconsin.201  The issue briefed 
and decided by the court was whether the Minnesota choice-of-law 
clause should be nullified by section 421.201(10).202  Unfortunately, that 
was not the correct issue in the case. 
 
192. Id. ¶ 3. 
193. Id. ¶ 6. 
194. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
195. Id. ¶ 9. 
196. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5) (2009–2010)). 
197. Id. ¶ 15. 
198. Id. ¶ 15 (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(a)) (noting “[t]he legislature’s command 
that the WCA be liberally interpreted in favor of consumers”). 
199. Id. ¶ 15. 
200. See id.  
201. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
202. Id. ¶ 9.  
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Section 421.201(4) provides that “any debt collection activity” in 
Wisconsin is subject to Chapter 427 of the WCA.203  Wisconsin obviously 
has a significant interest in controlling debt collection activity within its 
borders.  Similarly, section 421.201(5) provides that “Subchapters I and 
II of [Chapter] 425, relating to creditors remedies, . . . apply to [any] 
action[] or . . . proceeding[] brought in [Wisconsin] to enforce rights 
arising from consumer transactions . . . wherever made . . . .”204  The 
mandate in section 421.201(5) applies to a consumer transaction made in 
another state with a non-resident.205  In other words, once the merchant 
seeks to repossess in Wisconsin, the creditor must comply with section 
421.201(5) even though Wisconsin’s only connection to the extra–
territorial transaction is that the repossession occurs in Wisconsin.206  
Further, and more importantly, the mandate in section 421.201(5) 
applies to a consumer transaction where the customer is not a resident 
of Wisconsin at the time of the transaction, and the parties’ choice-of-
law provision provides that another state’s law will control.207  In other 
words, once the merchant seeks to repossess in Wisconsin, the creditor 
must comply with section 421.201(5) even though the parties’ choice-of-
law provision provided that other law would control.208  Both debt 
collection activity and repossessions are two areas where the paramount 
interest of the state in encouraging orderly conduct supersedes any 
private contract rights, including a choice-of-law clause.  Once CAC 
sought to repossess in Wisconsin, it became subject to section 
421.201(5).  Thus, the correct issue in Credit Acceptance Corp. was 
whether CAC complied with Subchapters I and II of Chapter 425 when 
it repossessed the automobile.  It is clear from the court’s discussion that 
CAC did not comply with a number of provisions contained in 
Subchapter I and II of Chapter 425.209  Therefore, the outcome was 
correct, but the nullification analysis under section 421.201(10) was 
 
203. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(4) (2011–2012).  
204. Id. § 421.201(5).  Notably, Section 425.206 is part of Subchapter II and prohibits the 
self–help repossession that occurred in Credit Acceptance Corp., 2012 WI App 98, 344 Wis. 2d 
259, 822 N.W.2d 506.  Id. § 425.206. 
205. Id. § 421.201(5). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. § 421.201(9)(a) (2011–2012). 
208. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Kong, 2012 WI App 98, ¶¶ 11, 15, 344 Wis. 2d 259, 
822 N.W.2d 506 (finding that the Minnesota choice-of-law provision was inapplicable and that 
to bring suit in Wisconsin, the out-of-state creditor must still comply with WCA provisions). 
209. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12–13 (noting that “Kong’s . . . retail installment contract is at odds 
with the applicable provisions of the WCA,” including the notice provision under § 425.104). 
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clearly a dictum, albeit disguised as the holding. 
As noted in Credit Acceptance Corp., section 421.201(10) provides 
that a foreign choice-of-law clause in a contract is invalid if Chapters 421 
to 427 apply to the transaction.210  The statutory issue raised by 
subsection 10 is whether the invalidation requires all or only a part of 
Chapters 421 to 427 to apply to the consumer transaction.211  The Credit 
Acceptance Corp. court opined that as long as some portion of the WCA 
applies to the transaction, no choice-of-law provision is effective.212  In 
other words, if only a part of the WCA applies to the transaction, 
invalidation of a foreign choice-of-law clause will result.213  However, a 
literal application of this analysis absolutely destroys any foreign choice-
of-law provision being used in Wisconsin.  Specifically, Chapter 427 of 
the WCA applies to all debt collection activity in Wisconsin.214  Further, 
“Subchapters I and II of [Chapter] 425, relating to creditors’ 
remedies, . . . apply to [all] actions or other proceedings brought in 
[Wisconsin] to enforce rights arising from consumer transactions,” such 
as repossession.215  There are no exceptions to the application of these 
two parts of the WCA.216  Debt collection activity in Wisconsin and any 
creditor seeking remedies in Wisconsin covers virtually 100% of creditor 
activity in Wisconsin.  Thus, the analysis used by the court in Credit 
Acceptance Corp. essentially eliminates all foreign choice-of-law 
provisions. 
A more reasonable approach suggests that invalidation should occur 
only when the full WCA, and not simply a part of the WCA, applies.  
When does the full WCA apply to a consumer transaction?  The full 
WCA applies to a consumer transaction when that consumer transaction 
is “made in Wisconsin.”217  Importantly, in addition to invalidating 
choice-of-law clauses, section 421.201(10) also invalidates any term in a 
 
210. Id. ¶ 15. 
211. Id. (stating that creditor argued that all provisions of Chapter 421 to 427 must 
apply).  The Court considered and rejected this argument, determining that “[a]s long as 
some portion of the WCA is applicable, no choice-of-law provisions are effective.”  Id. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. 
214. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(4) (2011–2012). 
215. Id. § 421.201(5). 
216. See id. § 421.202 (articulating exclusions to the WCA but not excluding debt 
collection activity or the type of creditors’ remedies found in Subchapters I and II of Chapter 
425). 
217. See supra Part II.A. 
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consumer transaction that indicates that the customer consents to the 
jurisdiction of another state218 or any term that fixes venue.219  In light of 
all three clauses that are invalidated by section 421.201(10), it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the legislature would want to protect 
Wisconsin residents who participated in a consumer transaction made in 
Wisconsin from a contract clause that provides any of the following: (a) 
that the law of another state shall apply; (b) that the customer consents 
to the jurisdiction of another state; or (c) that fixes venue.  What is the 
result if invalidation occurs only when the consumer transaction is 
“made in Wisconsin”?  Contracts with Wisconsin residents that are not 
made in Wisconsin, and contracts with non-residents who move to 
Wisconsin and become residents would be subject to: (1) compliance 
with Chapter 427 (Debt Collection),220 (2) Subchapters I and II of 
Chapter 425,221 or (3) the employment/temporary removal exception.222  
If a foreign choice-of-law clause falls outside one of those three 
enumerated circumstances, the clause should be honored in Wisconsin 
courts. 
F. Venue 
The WCA provides that if Chapters 421 to 427 apply to a 
transaction,223 any term that fixes venue is invalid.224  In addition, the 
WCA provides that if Chapters 421 to 427 apply to a transaction,225 any 
term that indicates that the customer consents to the jurisdiction of 
another state is invalid.226  Recall that there are different interpretations 
of the statutory language “if Chapters 421 to 427 applies to a 
transaction.”227 
 
218. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(b). 
219. Id. § 421.201(10)(c); see also Cottonwood Fin., LTD v. Estes, 2010 WI App 75, ¶ 19, 
325 Wis. 2d 749, 784 N.W.2d 726 (finding the contract was unconscionable for various other 
reasons but noting that its plain violation of section 421.201(10)(c) by purporting to fix venue 
might add further support for the court’s conclusion that the arbitration clause is 
substantively unconscionable). 
220. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(4); see supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
221. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5); see supra notes 58–79 and accompanying text. 
222. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(5); see supra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
223. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10). 
224. Id. § 421.201(10)(c); see supra note 219 (discussing Cottonwood Fin., LTD v. Estes, 
2010 WI App 75, ¶ 19, 325 Wis. 2d 749, 784 N.W.2d 726). 
225. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10). 
226. Id. § 421.201(10)(b). 
227. See supra Part II.E.3, for a discussion of this. 
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The WCA establishes venue for only two types of civil actions: 
consumer transactions and consumer credit transactions.228  If the WCA 
applies to the transaction, the WCA venue rules will control.229  In 
addition, if Chapters 421 to 427 apply to the transaction, the parties’ 
contract cannot fix venue other than as the WCA provides.230  On the 
other hand, if the transaction is not covered by the WCA, the general 
venue statutes231 will apply to the transaction.232  For the purposes of the 
WCA, “a claim arising out of a consumer transaction or a consumer 
credit transaction” can be brought in the county (1) “[w]here the 
customer resides”; (2) “[w]here the customer . . . is personally served”; 
(3) “[w]here the customer sought or acquired the property, services, 
money or credit [that] is the subject of the transaction”; (4) “[w]here the 
customer . . . signed the document” obligating him or her to the terms of 
the transaction; or (5) “[w]here [the] collateral securing a consumer 
credit transaction is located.”233  If venue is based on residence and there 
is more than one defendant, the claim can be brought in the county of 
any defendant.234  Further, a provision in a contract that requires 
disputes to be resolved by arbitration and permits venue in locations 
other than those established by the WCA has been held substantively 
unconscionable.235 
A failure to bring the action in the correct venue will cause the 
matter to be either transferred or dismissed.236  An evidentiary hearing is 
generally required to make a final legal determination on venue.237  
There is no time limit for objecting to venue under the WCA, unlike 
 
228. WIS. STAT. § 421.401.  
229. Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶ 20, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302. 
230. WIS. STAT. § 421.201(10)(c).  
231. Id. § 801.50–.64. 
232. Ehle v. Detlor, No. 1998AP0806, 1998 WL 541823, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 
1998) (finding venue was not governed by section 421.401 because the transaction did not 
qualify as a “consumer transaction” under sections 421.301(13) or 421.301(17)). 
233. WIS. STAT. § 421.401(1)(a)–(c). 
234. Id. § 421.401(3). 
235. See supra note 220 (citing Cottonwood Fin., LTD v. Estes, 2010 WI App 75, ¶¶ 21–
23, 325 Wis. 2d 749, 784 N.W.2d 726, where a venue-fixing term in a contract contrary to 
section 421.201(10)(c) was evidence of substantive unconscionability). 
236. See WIS. STAT. § 421.401(2)(a), (b).  
237. Condor Capital Corp. v. Lansing, No. 2010AP1807, 2011 WL 2135687, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 1, 2011) (reversing the lower court’s denial of motion to vacate adverse 
judgment brought by debtor because the lower court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether venue was proper before denying the debtor’s motion). 
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under the general venue statutes.238  If a claim on a consumer transaction 
is brought in a particular county and it appears that county is not the 
proper place for the trial of the action, the court must transfer the action 
to the proper county, “unless the defendant appears and waives the 
improper venue.”239  However, if the claim is based on a consumer credit 
transaction,240 the court must dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.241  
Dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction entitles the moving party 
to attorney fees.242  In addition, any judgment entered in a consumer 
credit transaction where venue was improper is void from the time of 
entry.243  Conversely, if the WCA is not applicable, a defect in venue 
does not affect the validity of the judgment.244  Also, a party’s failure to 
comply with the pleading requirements245 of the WCA is not a 
jurisdictional defect that renders a judgment void.246 
 
238. Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶ 40, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 158–59, 785 
N.W.2d 302, 313 (comparing the 2007–2008 version of section 421.401(2), which does not 
impose a time limit, with the general venue statute, WIS. STAT. § 801.51, which does, as 
support for the court’s interpretation that the WCA “places the onus on plaintiffs, typically 
creditors, to properly venue an action or risk dismissal when the defendant brings the 
improper venue to the circuit court’s attention”). 
239. WIS. STAT. § 421.401(2)(a) (2011–2012); Johnson v. Berge, 2003 WI App 51, ¶¶ 7–
8, 260 Wis. 2d 758, 659 N.W.2d 418 (citing Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 
596 N.W.2d 786, 793 (1999)) (noting that defect in venue is not a jurisdictional matter except 
in actions relating to consumer credit transactions); Johnson, 2003 WI App 51, ¶ 9, 260 Wis. 
3d 758, 659 N.W.2d 418 (citing State ex rel. Hansen v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 181 Wis. 
2d 993, 1001–02, 513 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 1994)) (finding that the appropriate response 
when a defect in venue is not a jurisdictional matter is a “change of venue, not a motion to 
dismiss”).   
240. See Anzivino, supra note 3, at 208. 
241. WIS. STAT. § 421.401(2)(b). 
242. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc. v. Johnson, 228 Wis. 2d 30, 36–37, 596 N.W.2d 799, 802 
(1999) (finding that award of attorney fees upon a violation of the WCA’s venue provision is 
consistent with the purpose of the WCA to “protect[] customers from the serious problems 
and inconveniences accompanying actions prosecuted in an improper venue”). 
243. Kett, 228 Wis. 2d at 12–13, 596 N.W.2d at 792 (“[I]n general a defect in venue is not 
a jurisdictional defect affecting the validity of a judgment.  Nevertheless, . . . this case falls 
within a legislatively crafted exception to the general venue provision. . . .  [T]he defect in 
venue in these replevin actions arising from consumer credit transactions render[s] the 
Milwaukee County default replevin judgments invalid from the time of entry for purposes of 
WIS. STAT. § 425.206(1)(b).”). 
244. WIS. STAT. § 801.50(1); Radtke v. Levin, No. 2001AP2616, 2002 WL 772750, at 
¶¶ 3–9 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002) (rejecting the debtor’s argument that the transaction 
was a consumer credit transaction and thus applying the general venue statute and leaving the 
judgment unaffected). 
245. WIS. STAT. § 425.109 (3). 
246. Mercado v. GE Money Bank, 2009 WI App 73, ¶ 22, 318 Wis. 2d 216, 229–30, 768 
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The requirements for a waiver of improper venue in a consumer 
transaction (not a consumer credit transaction) were delineated in 
Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp.247  In Brunton, Brunton purchased an 
automobile on a seventy-two-month installment sale contract.248  Two 
years after the purchase, Brunton defaulted on her payments.249  Several 
months later, Brunton sued Nuvell in Dane County alleging various 
WCA violations.250  Nuvell appeared in the action and filed an answer.251  
The parties litigated in Dane County for the next fourteen months.252  
While this litigation was ongoing, Nuvell commenced a replevin action 
in Rock County.253  During the replevin action, Brunton’s attorney 
“requested that Nuvell stipulate to transferring venue [from Dane 
County] to Rock County, rather than . . . dismissing the Dane County 
action and re-filing in Rock County.”254  Nuvell refused to stipulate and 
moved for summary judgment dismissing the action in Dane County.255  
Brunton argued that Nuvell had appeared and waived the improper 
Dane County venue.256  More specifically, Brunton asserted that Nuvell 
waived the improper venue because Nuvell did not raise the improper 
venue at the outset of the litigation.257  The court noted that the “proper 
venue [was] Rock County because that [was] where Brunton reside[d], 
where Brunton acquired the car, where the car [was] located and where 
Brunton signed the installment sale contract.”258  The court rejected 
Brunton’s implied waiver argument.259  Instead, the court noted that in 
order to waive improper venue, the statute requires that a party both 
appear and waive the improper venue, which are two distinctly different 
 
N.W.2d 53, 60 (finding that, unlike the venue provision of the WCA, section 425.109(3) does 
not demonstrate legislative intent to limit the court’s jurisdiction). 
247. Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶¶ 39–40, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 
302. 
248. Id. ¶ 2. 
249. Id. ¶ 3. 
250. Id. ¶ 4. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. 
254. Id. ¶ 5. 
255. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
256. Id. ¶ 6. 
257. Id. ¶ 13. 
258. Id. ¶ 24. 
259. Id. ¶ 37. 
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acts.260  The court reasoned that “[a] party ‘appears’ in an action either 
formally, by serving and filing a notice of appearance or an answer or by 
making a motion that serves to extend the time to answer, or informally, 
by actively litigating the merits of an issue without raising any 
jurisdictional objection.”261 
The court indicated that three requirements must be met for a 
waiver: first, the party claiming the waiver must prove “that the 
defendant knew the place of proper venue”;262 second, that the 
defendant “knew that he had the right to [dismiss] . . . the case when it 
was not properly venued”;263 and third, that the party “intentionally 
relinquished” the improper venue.264 
Further, the court noted that a waiver could occur either “by an 
express statement or by conduct.”265  Waivers by express statement can 
occur “by filing a written stipulation with the court or by [an] oral 
stipulation made in open court and entered in the record . . . .”266  Waiver 
by conduct occurs “by affirmative acts that unambiguously demonstrate 
that [the party] knows the place of proper venue, as well as the right to 
dismissal of the improperly venued action . . . , and that he nonetheless 
intends to relinquish such rights.”267 
III. CONCLUSION 
In order for a transaction to be subject to the WCA, the transaction 
must be a consumer transaction or a consumer credit transaction and 
satisfy one of the territorial requirements mandated by the Act.  A 
transaction “made in Wisconsin” will be subject to all the provisions of 
the WCA for any enforcement sought in Wisconsin.  Certain sections of 
the WCA may also apply to enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction for 
transactions “made in Wisconsin” if the parties’ contract contains a 
Wisconsin choice-of-law clause.  Any collection activity in Wisconsin 
will always trigger certain sections of the WCA.  Whether the consumer 
 
260. Id. ¶ 28. 
261. Id. ¶ 30 (quoting 4 AM. JUR. 2D § 1 (2007)). 
262. Id. ¶ 37. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. ¶ 38 (citing Fraser v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 114 Wis. 510, 523–24, 90 N.W. 476, 481 
(1902)). 
265. Id. ¶ 38. 
266. Id. ¶ 39. 
267. Id. 
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was a Wisconsin resident or not at the time of the foreign transaction 
will determine the specific sections of the WCA that will be applicable 
to the Wisconsin collection activity.  Any collection activity outside of 
Wisconsin is generally not subject to the WCA, and foreign law will 
govern.  However, various sections of the WCA will apply to collection 
activity in a foreign jurisdiction if the transaction falls within the WCA’s 
employment/temporary removal exception or the parties’ contract 
contains a Wisconsin choice-of-law clause.  There must, however, be a 
sufficient quantum of contacts between the out-of-state merchant and 
Wisconsin to satisfy Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements 
before the WCA can apply in the foreign jurisdiction.  A foreign choice-
of-law clause will have effect in Wisconsin courts under specified 
circumstances.  However, the WCA has a nullification provision that 
may entirely nullify the foreign choice-of-law clause.  Further, even 
though a foreign choice-of-law clause may be enforceable in Wisconsin, 
there are certain exceptions that will limit the scope of the foreign 
choice-of-law clause.  And finally, the rules regarding venue under the 
WCA are significantly different than the rules under the general venue 
statutes. 
 
